Consider a differential game for two players in infinite time horizon, with exponentially discounted costs. A pair of feedback controls (u *
Introduction
Consider non-cooperative differential game for two-players, where the state of the system evolves according toẋ = f (x, u 1 , u 2 ) .
(1.1)
Here x ∈ IR n while the control functions u 1 (·) and u 2 (·) range over the domains u 1 ∈ U 1 ⊆ IR m 1 , u 2 ∈ U 2 ⊆ IR m 2 . The upper dot denotes a derivative w.r.t. time. The goal of each player is to minimize his own cost functional
This corresponds to an infinite horizon problem, with exponentially discounted cost.
Given a feedback strategy x → u 1 (x) implemented by Player 1, we say that the feedback strategy x → u 2 (x) is a best reply for Player 2, and write u 2 ∈ R 2 (u 1 ), if u 2 (·) is optimal for the problem minimize:
with dynamicsẋ = f (x, u 1 (x), u 2 ) .
(1.4)
More precisely, we are here requiring that (i) for every initial state x 0 ∈ IR n , the Cauchy probleṁ 5) has at least one Carathéodory solution, defined for all times t ≥ 0.
(ii) Every Carathéodory solution of (1.5) is optimal in the sense that, given the initial state x 0 and the feedback u 1 (·), the control u 2 (·) minimizes the cost J 2 among all strategies u 2 (·) available to Player 2.
Given a feedback strategy x → u 2 (x) implemented by Player 2, a best reply u 1 ∈ R 1 (u 2 ), for Player 1 is defined in a similar way.
Two feedback strategies u 1 = u * 1 (x), u 2 = u * 2 (x) constitute a Nash equilibrium solution to the differential game (1.1)-(1.2) if at the same time one has
One can regard the Nash solution as a fixed point of the "best reply" map (u 1 , u 2 ) → (R 1 (u 2 ) , R 2 (u 1 )).
(1.7)
Assuming that this "best reply" is unique, a natural question is whether the fixed point is asymptotically stable. In other words, let (u
1 , u
2 ) be a pair of feedback controls sufficiently close to a Nash equilibrium (u * 1 , u * 2 ), and define the iterates (u
Is it true that (u
2 ) → (u * 1 , u * 2 ) as k → ∞? In the present note we provide a positive answer for a class of games with linear dynamics and quadratic costs, as long as the feedback controls u (k) i (·) are affine functions of the state x ∈ IR n . In general, this convergence is not expected to hold for nonlinear systems. Indeed, we show by an example that, even for a linear-quadratic game, the fixed point of the best reply map is not stable w.r.t. nonlinear perturbations of the feedback controls, even if these perturbations have uniformly bounded support and are arbitrarily small in any C k norm.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the basic theory of linear-quadratic optimal control problems in infinite time horizon, focusing on how the optimal feedback changes as a consequence of small variations in the dynamics and in the cost function. In Section 3 we briefly review the equations determining a Nash equilibrium solution to a linear-quadratic differential game.
After these preliminaries, Section 4 analyzes the stability of the best reply maps for linearquadratic games, within the class of feedback controls which are affine functions of the state. Finally, in Section 5 we provide an example showing that, even for a simple linear-quadratic game, the Nash equilibrium feedbacks are not stable w.r.t. nonlinear perturbations.
For a general introduction to differential games we refer to [1, 5] . Linear-quadratic games have an extensive literature, see for example [6, 11] and references therein. For nonlinear problems, the papers [7, 8] analyze the relations between solutions to differential games and optimal feedback controls. Examples of feedback solutions to nonlinear differential games in infinite time horizon were studied in [4, 9] . For a special class of "nearly decoupled" games, an iterative procedure yielding a Nash solution can be found in [10] .
2 Review of the linear-quadratic optimal control problem Consider a system on IR n , with dynamicṡ
and a cost functional
Here x ∈ IR n , u ∈ IR m are column vectors, while the superscript † denotes transposition. Moreover
Without loss of generality we can assume P = P † . We also remark that, if R ∈ IR m×m is a symmetric, strictly positive definite matrix, then the more general cost functional
can be reduced to (2.2). Indeed, it suffices to use a new set of control variables v = Λu, with Λ † Λ = R. This yields
Let V be the value function for the optimization problem (2.1)-(2.2). More precisely, let t → x(t, u,x) be the solution to (2.1) corresponding to the control function u(·) and the initial data
We then define
. . , V xn ) the row vector describing the gradient of V , the optimal feedback control u * is provided by
Differentiating w.r.t. ω, we obtain
It is well known that, if the value function V is continuously differentiable function, then it provides a solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation
After some calculations, this yields
This can be written as
where
for some symmetric matrix M , some vector n and a scalar e. This implies
Inserting (2.13)-(2.14) in (2.11) one obtains
Equating homogeneous terms of the same degree, and observing that
The first equation in(2.16) is a quadratic equation for the n × n symmetric matrix M , whose solution depends on the matrices A, B, P, Q. Existence and uniqueness of solutions is not guaranteed, in general. As soon as the matrix M is determined, the last two equations in (2.16) yield the values of the vector n and of the scalar e. These last two equations are linear w.r.t. n, e.
Next, assume that a solution of the equations (2.16) has been found. According to (2.6) the optimal feedback control is
The system dynamics is thus described bẏ
Our basic assumption will be that this dynamics is asymptotically stable. Equivalent conditions for this to happen are:
(i) The linear homogeneous systeṁ
is asymptotically stable.
(ii) All the eigenvalues of the matrix Y in (2.19) have strictly negative real part.
(iii) There exist constants C, ω > 0 such that norm of the exponential matrix satisfies
We write (2.17) in the form u
where the m × n-matrix U and the m-vector v are given by
Clearly, this optimal feedback u * depends on the coefficients A, B, c of the system (2.1) and on the coefficients P, Q, a, b of the cost functional (2.2). Keeping B, Q, b constant, we wish to understand how U, v depend on the remaining parameters A, P, c, a. In other words, we study the differential of the map
Assume that we replace (A, c, P, a) by (A + εA , c + εc , P + εP , a + εa ). Then the optimal feedback will have the form
We seek an expression for (U , v ) as a linear function of A , P , c , a , depending on A, P, c, a.
inside the first equation in (2.16) and recalling (2.12) one obtains
Collecting terms of order ε we find
We thus seek an n × n symmetric matrix M such that
Notice that S is symmetric, but Y may not be symmetric. Of course, the left hand side of (2.25) is always symmetric. The solution to (2.25) is provided by the formula
Notice that the integral is absolutely convergent, because of (2.20). Observing that M is symmetric, the above formula can be verified by writing
According to (2.22), the first order variations of the matrix U and of the vector v are computed by
The symmetric matrix M has already been computed at (2.27). Notice that M depends only on the first order variations A , P and not on c , a .
For future use, we seek an expression for n in the special case where A = 0, P = 0. By (2.12), the second equation in (2.16) yields
Notice that the matrix
is certainly invertible. Indeed, the stability assumption (2.20) implies all of its eigenvalues have real part > γ.
A linear-quadratic differential game
We now consider a differential game for two players, with controls u 1 ∈ IR m 1 , u 2 ∈ IR m 2 . In place of (2.1), the dynamics is now described bẏ
Assume that the cost functionals for the two players have the form
Assume that the value functions V 1 , V 2 are second order polynomials in the space variables x 1 , . . . , x n :
Then the optimal feedback controls u * 1 , u * 2 for the two players are determined by
The strategies (3.5) yield a Nash equilibrium solution in feedback form provided that the value functions V 1 , V 2 satisfy the system of P.D.E's
Inserting in (3.6) the expressions (3.3) for V 1 , V 2 , and using (3.4), (3.7), (3.8), one obtains 9) and an entirely similar equation holds for V 2 .
We regard (3.9) as an identity between two polynomials of degree 2 in the variables x 1 , . . . , x n . Equating the coefficients of the quadratic terms, one obtains a system of algebraic equations for the coefficients of the symmetric matrices M 1 , M 2 . A direct computation yields
(3.11)
Throughout the following, we assume that there exists a pair of n × n symmetric matrices M 1 , M 2 providing a solution to the above system. Moreover, we assume that the resulting dynamics is asymptotically stable, so that all the eigenvalues of the matrix
have strictly negative real parts.
Next, equating the coefficients of the linear terms in (3.9), we obtain a system of linear equations for the vectors n 1 , n 2 :
Finally, equating the constant terms on the two sides of (3.9), one obtains an expression for e 1 , e 2 :
(3.14)
Affine perturbations
Now consider the differential game (3.1)-(3.2). Let the feedback controls
provide a Nash equilibrium solution. Let V 1 , V 2 be the value functions for the two players, so that all the identities (3.3)-(3.14) hold.
We wish to understand whether this solution is stable w.r.t. iterations of the best reply map. In this section we study the case of affine perturbations, while in the next section is concerned with general nonlinear perturbations. As we shall see, the answer is quite different in the two cases.
To state the question more precisely, consider two perturbed feedback controls
By induction on N , define a sequence of feedback controls
where u
1 is the optimal feedback for Player 1, in reply to the feedback u . We seek conditions which guarantee that, if the pair (u
2 ) is sufficiently close to (u * 1 , u * 2 ), then one has the convergence (u
For this purpose, we consider the two maps
and compute the differential of the composite mapping Φ 2 • Φ 1 at the equilibrium point (U 1 , U 2 ). Consider a small perturbation of the feedback for the first player:
Then the optimal feedback for the second player will also be changed, say
The perturbation U 2 is computed as in (2.29), (2.27). Indeed, from the point of view of the second player, perturbing U 1 and v 1 amounts to replacing the dynamicṡ
Moreover, the cost functional
By the analysis in Section 2, the differential of the map Φ 2 in (4.5) is the linear map U 1 → U 2 defined by
10)
11)
The differential of the map Φ 1 is computed by the same formulas, (4.10)-(4.12), permuting the indices 1,2.
We now consider the composition of two iterations, say
, where the matrices B 1 , B 2 do not change from one iteration to the next. We have the estimate can be estimated by
(4.13) Calling
we can now state Theorem 1. Let V i , i = 1, 2 be the value functions corresponding to a Nash equilibrium feedback solution. Assume that
Then the Nash equilibrium is asymptotically stable w.r.t. iterations of the best reply map, within the class of piecewise affine feedback controls.
Proof. Consider the composite mapping
where u 2 (x) = U 2 x+v 2 is the best reply for Player 2 to the feedback u 1 (x) = U 1 x+v 1 used by Player 1, whileũ 1 (x) = U 1 x+ṽ 1 is the best reply for Player 1 to the feedback u 2 (x) = U 2 x+v 2 . Consider the corresponding value functions
(4.17) By (3.5)
i n i + b ii . Therefore, to prove convergence of the iterates of the best reply map, it suffices to prove the convergence of the iterates of the composite map
Consider the differential of this mapping, computed at the Nash equilibrium:
To prove the theorem, it suffices to show that the powers of this matrix converge to zero:
Since ∂ M 1 /∂n 1 = 0, the convergence in (4.20) will follow from the two inequalities
By (4.13), the first inequality follows from the assumption (4.14).
Next, applying (2.30) with
we obtain
and the second inequality in (4.21) follows from the assumption (4.15).
Example 1. The previous result applies, in particular, to a differential game with one weak player, considered in [2, 3] . Let the cost functionals be as in (3.2), but assume that the dynamics has the formẋ = Ax + B 1 u 1 + θB 2 u 2 + f . When θ = 0, the Nash equilibrium solution is attained after one iteration. Indeed, in this case the second player cannot affect the evolution of the system. His best strategy is thus the myopic one:
regardless of the feedback u 1 (·) implemented by the first player.
On the other hand, for θ > 0, replacing the term B 2 by θB 2 it is clear that the assumptions (4.14)-(4.15) are satisfied, as long as θ remains small enough.
Nonlinear perturbations
The convergence result proved in the previous section strongly relied on the linear-quadratic structure of the game, and on the fact that all perturbed feedback controls remained within the class of affine functions of the state x.
In this section we show that, even for a linear-quadratic game, the iterates of the best reply map may fail to converge, as soon as we consider feedback controls which are not affine functions of the state.
Example 2. Consider the game with linear dynamicṡ
and quadratic payoff functionals
We assume here 0 < a < b. Call V 1 (x), V 2 (x) the value functions for the two players. Their derivatives will be written as
The optimal controls are then computed as
The value functions V 1 , V 2 can be found by solving the system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations
(5.8)
Notice that
Differentiating (5.6) we obtain the system
In matrix notation, this can be written as
The system (5.11) admits the constant solution
This correspond to a Nash equilibrium solution of the differential game consisting of two constant feedback controls:
Next, we study whether there exist other solutions, possibly described by nonlinear feedbacks u 1 (x), u 2 (x). Following [2, 3] , we write (5.11) as a Pfaffian system
(5.14)
The graph of a solution to (5.11) can then be obtained by suitably concatenating trajectories of the vector field
Notice that the first component of v vanishes along the conical surface
At a point P ∈ Γ we either have v(P ) = 0 ∈ IR 3 , or else the vector v(P ) is vertical. The only way to connect trajectories of the vector field v forming the graph of a smooth function x → W (x) = (y(x), z(x)) is to cross the surface Γ somewhere along the two curves where v vanishes, namely
Observe that the map
describes a heteroclinic orbit of the vector field v in (5.15), connecting the two stationary points
Setting X(t) . = a + b − 2x(t), the Jacobian matrix of the vector field v at the point P (t) is
The eigenvalues λ i and the corresponding eigenvectors w i of the matrix A(t) are:
20)
In particular, at the point P − the three eigenvalues are − √ ab < 0 < 2 √ ab, while at the point P + the eigenvalues are −2 √ ab < 0 < √ ab. Since the eigenvectors are constant, the general solution to the linear equationẏ = A(t)y can be written as Let us call Σ + the 2-dimensional manifold of points P = (x,ξ,η) such that the solution tȯ
satisfies P (t) → γ + as t → −∞. Similarly, call Σ − the 2-dimensional manifold of points P = (x,ξ,η) such that the solution of (5.24) satisfies P (t) → γ − as t → +∞. By (5.23), these two manifolds intersect transversally along the segment P − P + . We conclude that there can be no other solutions to (5.11), in a neighborhood of the constant solution (5.12).
We claim that this pair of feedback controls, providing a fixed point of the "best reply" map is unstable w.r.t. nonlinear perturbations. More precisely: Proposition 1. There exists δ > 0 and a sequence of smooth perturbations φ k ∈ C ∞ c (IR) such that the following holds.
• The C k norms of φ k satisfy
• For any k ≥ 1, starting with the values
2 ) of the best reply map do not converge to the solution (u * 1 , u * 2 ) in (5.13). Indeed,
Proof. To construct the nonlinear perturbations φ k , choose 0 < δ << 1 and let x 0 . = a+b 2 + 3δ. Consider the standard C ∞ function with compact support
Choosing sequences of numbers numbers 0 < c k << ε k converging to zero sufficiently fast, the condition (5.25) can be easily satisfied.
We now examine the sequence of iterations of the best reply map, starting from the initial feedbacks
Assume ξ (N ) , η (N ) have been determined. By (5.11), the next iteration yields a pair of functions ξ (N +1) (x) and η (N +1) (x), respectively providing solutions to At this stage, one should observe that the system of ODEs (5.11), as well as the two ODEs in (5.29), are not supplemented by initial data. It is the singularity in the coefficients that determines one particular, globally defined solution. For the system (5.11), the 2 × 2 matrix of coefficients fails to be invertible on the conical surface Γ at (5.16). A globally smooth solution is found by concatenating trajectories of the vector field v in (5.15). As we have seen, these trajectories must cross Γ at points where v vanishes. Since the manifolds Σ + , Σ − intersect transversally, the segment P + P − is the only heteroclinic orbit, and the unique Nash equilibrium solution is (5.13).
On the other hand, the right hand sides of (5.29) are both singular at points where ξ+η−x = 0. At each iteration, the only solution which is regular across the surface where ξ + η − x = 0 is the one for which 
